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INTRODUCTION
The banking industry is one of the most heavily regulated indus-
tries in the United States.' Some of the banking regulations have re-
sulted merely from historical circumstance,2 while others have been
1. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING
LAW AND REGULATION 73 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the American banking system
extensively); ALFRED LEWIS & GIOIA PESCETrO, EU AND US BANKING IN THE
1990S 72 (1996) (providing an overview of the current regulation of the banking
industries in the European Union and the United States).
2. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that few areas of Ameri-
can law are influenced more significantly by history than banking law and pur-
porting that much of the quirkiness of banking laws can be understood only
through historical analysis); see also Richard M. Whiting, The New Tri-Partite'
Banking System, 17 BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 16, 1998, at 13 (1998) (explaining
that the United States' current dual banking system, which provides the option of
obtaining a federal or a state charter, was an unintended result of Congress' crea-
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designed to attain specific policy objectives.' Notwithstanding an in-
tricate regulatory structure, recent marketplace developments' and
administrative initiatives5 demonstrate that the current regulatory
framework for the domestic financial services 6 industry is now out-
moded.7 Moreover, the globalization of international markets' and the
tion of the national bank charter in 1863). The dual banking system, in turn, has
unexpectedly fostered the development of many innovative financial products,
such as the interest-bearing checking account. See id.
3. See S. REP. No. 73-455, at 1 (1934) (justifying the passage of the Glass
Steagall Act of 1933, which restricts the ability of commercial banks to engage in
certain securities transactions, as a means to prevent further abuses by banks in the
securities industry). The abuses at issue concerned action occurring in the 1920s
that allegedly led to the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent banking
crisis of the early 1930s. See id. at 1-2; see also LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1,
at 74 (indicating that certain provisions of the Glass Steagall Act, such as those
that separate commercial from investment banking, were intended to circumscribe
the free banking of the 1920s and to return bankers to their original conservative
service roles).
4. See Future of Banking: Financial Modernization Is Occurring Apace With-
out New Legislation, BANKING POL'Y REP., July 1, 1996, at 12 (emphasizing that
true financial modernization has already occurred in the marketplace and that the
industry will continue to evolve and pose new issues for bankers, policymakers,
and regulators). As a result, legislators redraffing the financial service laws must
base those new laws on principles that respect, rather than combat, the market
forces that are currently redefining the banking industry. See id.
5. See, e.g., Developments in Banking Law: 1997, 17 ANN. REv. BANKING L.
2, 6-7 (1998) (explaining that although Congressional attempts to reform the
banking industry in 1997 failed, the Federal Reserve has taken administrative ac-
tion to liberalize the rules governing banks and their affiliates). For example, in
1987, the Federal Reserve Board permitted bank holding companies to create secu-
rities underwriting affiliates under section 20 of the Glass Steagall Act. See id. at 6.
The Federal Reserve Board has also continued to raise the percentage limit of
gross revenues that can be generated from such bank-ineligible securities by bank
holding companies. See id. at 6-7.
6. See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN? WHAT COULD WE LOSE? 5 (1994) (de-
fining financial services, generally, as including activities such as: deposit taking;
lending; underwriting and distributing new issues of debt and equity securities; se-
curities trading and brokerage; investment management; fee-based advisory activi-
ties; insurance; foreign exchange transactions; and derivative instruments, such as
futures and options).
7. See Robert M. Kurucza & Barry I. Pershkow, Securities and Investment
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deregulation of banking services in industrialized countries9 have
significantly affected the competitive posture of American financial
institutions and have potentially placed the domestic banking indus-
try at a competitive disadvantage.'"
Over the past several years, Congress has, to no avail, attempted to
liberalize domestic banking regulations." While the many parties
implicated by such reform' 2 agree that the current financial system
Activities of Banks, 53 Bus. LAW. 1145, 1154 (1998) (concluding that the increas-
ing importance of securities and investment activities to commercial banks demon-
strates that the Glass Steagall Act is an anachronistic law, largely outdated by
regulatory action and marketplace developments).
8. See Financial Modernization-Part 11: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong., 405, 407 (1997) (statement of Eugene A.
Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Hearings: Statement of
Eugene Ludwig] (postulating that technological innovation has fueled economic
globalization, which, in turn, has increased competition in the financial services
market).
9. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY NEWS RELEASE, OCC
NR 97-34, at 1 (Mar. 24, 1997) (concluding that the United States was a notable
exception in the study of sixteen European countries, as well as Canada and Japan,
which found that almost all of those countries permit their banks directly or indi-
rectly through subsidiaries to engage in a wide range of financial services, such as
underwriting, dealing, and brokering in securities and insurance).
10. See id. at 2 (reporting that the former Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene
A. Ludwig, commended the comparative study of banking systems and argued that
American banks must not be encumbered with restrictions that are not applied to
their international competitors if they are expected to continue facilitating the na-
tion's economic growth in the twenty-first century); see also LEWIS & PESCETTO,
supra note 1, at 192 (concluding that the American banking system is much more
restrictive than that of the European Union and emphasizing the need for reform of
the United States' regulatory system to enable American banks to compete inter-
nationally).
11. See Developments in Banking Law: 1997, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining
that Congress has made many attempts over the past several years to repeal the
Glass Steagall Act of 1933 and to reform the American banking laws, only to be
thwarted by powerful interest groups).
12. See J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues
Raised by Financial Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25, 26 (1998) (identi-
fying the major parties involved in the continuing debate concerning financial
modernization including: banking, insurance, and securities industries; the Treas-
ury Department; the Federal Reserve Board; the Office of the Comptroller of the
1718 [14:1715
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needs to be revamped,'3 the complex web of policy,'4 economic,'" and
supervisory interests '6 has made the creation of an acceptable finan-
cial modernization proposal a daunting task for Congress. Despite
numerous hurdles, however, Congress persists in taking action to
revolutionize the way the United States runs its banking industry.'7
On January 6, 1999, the House Banking and Financial Services
Committee of the United States House of Representatives, intro-
duced House Bill 10, the Financial Services Act of 1999 ("H.R. 10"
or "financial reform legislation")." H.R. 10 represents Congress'
most recent effort to achieve the elusive goal of reforming the na-
tion's financial services laws.'9 Although previous reform efforts
have failed,20 the 106th Congress is bringing financial reform legisla-
Currency; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission).
13. See id. (explaining that the key parties directly affected by the debate for
financial modernization agree that financial reform is necessary to establish a solid
foundation for the American financial system in the new millenium).
14. See id. at 27 (identifying policy issues implicated by banking reform, such
as the need to restructure the nation's current financial system in an efficient, safe,
and sound manner so as not to unduly endanger depositors and the federal safety
net).
15. See id. at 26 (discussing economic interests, such as providing American
customers with a full array of financial products and services and thereby enabling
American banks to compete effectively for financial services in the global arena).
16. See id. at 40 (highlighting supervisory issues, such as whether there is a
need for umbrella supervision, in addition to functional supervision of the increas-
ingly complex and diverse subparts of financial conglomerates).
17. See Brian Collins, Once Clinton's Trial is Over. Granin Ready to Move,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWs, Jan. 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS library (an-
nouncing that the new Senate Banking Committee Chairman, Senator Phil Gramm,
is listening to all interested parties in financial reform to foster bipartisan consen-
sus and enable the passage of a financial services modernization bill).
18. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (passed by the full House of Representa-
tives on July 1, 1999).
19. See Collins, supra note 17 (reporting on Senator Phil Gramm's announce-
ment of his intention to use 1998's financial services modernization bill, H.R. 10,
as a starting framework for financial reform in 1999).
20. See Why the Magna Bank Case Is So Significant, NAT'L UNDERWRITER:
LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVS. ED., Jan. 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS li-
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tion closer to enactment than ever before. 1 This significant stride is
due, in part, to the enthusiasm for reform in both the House2 and the
Senate.23 In fact, even if this year's financial reform legislation is not
enacted, Congress will undoubtedly reintroduce similar reform leg-
islation in the upcoming year, as the need to revamp the domestic
banking regulatory structure will not disappear. Accordingly, a study
of the proposed legislation's innovative provisions24 will facilitate a
better understanding of what banking in the twenty-first century may
look like and how the proposed national banking regime will com-
21pare to its international competitors.
This Comment examines H.R. 10's proposed liberalization of the
brary (recognizing that although the 105th Congress did not achieve financial
modernization, it bequeathed a feasible blueprint for reform to the 106th Congress,
drafted after much negotiation and compromise among the interested industries).
21. The House Banking and Financial Services Committee passed an earlier
draft of H.R. 10 on February 27, 1999; the House Commerce Committee passed a
revised version of H.R. 10 on June 15, 1999. Finally, the full House of Representa-
tives passed its final version of H.R. 10 on July 1, 1999. In addition, the United
States Senate Banking Committee passed its version of H.R. 10 financial reform
legislation on May 6, 1999. See Modernization Act of 1999, S.900, 106th Cong.
(1999).
22. See Ola Kinnander, Bank Deregulation: Leach Introduces Similar Meas-
ure, BOND BUYER, Jan. 8, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS library (announcing
that the House Banking and Financial Services Committee introduced legislation to
dismantle the current regulatory framework that separates the banking, insurance,
and securities industries, and that it plans to hold hearings and subsequently mark
up the bill).
23. See Lynn Stevens Hume, Banking Committee Hopes to Pass Financial
Reform Bill in February, BOND BUYER, Jan. 13, 1999, available in LEXIS, NEWS
library (stating that Senator Phil Gramm set forth an aggressive agenda of banking
goals).
24. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 101 (1999) (repealing sections 20 and 32 of
the Glass Steagall Act, which would liberalize the legal barriers that currently pre-
vent commercial banks from affiliating with securities firms).
25. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 9, at 3
(identifying the key global competitors as the European Union, Japan, and the
United States, and analyzing the range of activities their banks are permitted to en-
gage in). The Comptroller's study also highlighted that while the securities activi-
ties of banks in the European Union are unrestricted, the United States is the most
restrictive of all countries in permitting banks to engage in the broad array of ac-
tivities that are sought after in the global financial marketplace. See id.
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securities powers 6 of commercial banks27 in the United States and
contrasts it with the currently deregulated banking structure of the
European Union's Second Banking Directive. "a Part I sets forth the
present legal framework governing the securities powers of commer-
cial banks in the United States. Part II contrasts this national scheme
with the legal framework governing commercial banking and securi-
ties activities in the European Union. Part IlI analyzes the proposed
securities powers for American commercial banks under H.R. 10 and
compares them to the powers of commercial banks under the univer-
sal banking structure 9 maintained in the European Union. Part IV
26. See MIACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 496 (describing securities powers
as activities such as: (1) owning and holding securities for an institution's own ac-
count; (2) brokerage, the process of uniting a buyer and a seller of a security for a
commission; (3) dealing, the business of maintaining a stock of securities and
buying and selling them in the market with the goal of making a profit on the dif-
ference between the sales price and the purchase price; and (4) underwriting, the
process of distributing securities to the public). The Glass Steagall Act, part of the
Banking Act of 1933, regulates the securities powers of commercial banks in the
United States and was enacted because of Congress' belief that the commingling of
the business of banking with that of dealing in securities was a dangerous combi-
nation. See id. at 495-96.
27. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 111-12 (defining an American
commercial bank as a financial institution funded by demand deposits, time and
savings deposits, and short-term loans made to businesses, with the ultimate goal
of providing financial assistance to businesses). Although not originally part of
their function, commercial banks also are increasingly participating in the mort-
gage markets. See id. Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") was created by the Banking Act of 1933 with the purpose of supervising,
regulating, and insuring commercial bank depositors. See id. The Banking Act of
1933, in addition to creating the FDIC, proscribed commercial banks from dealing
in securities with the Glass Steagall provisions, which divorced commercial bank-
ing activities from investment banking activities in the United States. See id. at 74.
28. See Second Council Directive 89/646 of Dec. 15, 1989 on the Coordination
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and
Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77i78OEEC,
1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive] (reforming the Euro-
pean Union's financial services industry).
29. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 126-27 (defining universal-type
banking systems as those where a single bank can provide a wide array of serv-
ices). The services that a universal bank can provide include both commercial
banking - for example, retail, wholesale, and service banking - and investment
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examines the potential problems that may arise from financial reform
if H.R. 10 or similar legislation is enacted. Part V makes several rec-
ommendations for liberalization of the domestic banking industry in
light of the European Union's experiences with a deregulated finan-
cial services structure. Finally, this Comment concludes that while
domestic financial reform is needed, Congress should consider the
success of the European Union's Second Banking Directive and re-
evaluate whether H.R. 10's current approach to reform, which re-
stricts corporate structure and maintains the present supervisory re-
gime, is an adequate response to the internationalization of the
banking marketplace.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING
COMMERCIAL BANKING AND
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE DIVORCE OF COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT BANKING BY THE GLASS STEAGALL ACT
Before 1900, although no formal law proscribed a commercial
bank from engaging in securities activities," distinct and separate
entities conducted investment banking activities3' in the United
banking - for example, the stock market, securities, insurance, and real estate. See
id. at 126; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 723 (explaining that the
European Union operates under a liberal style of universal banking that is arguably
the least restrictive in the world). The European Union's system allows banks to
engage in the taking of deposits, consumer and commercial lending, securities un-
derwriting and trading, mutual fund operations, investment counseling, and the
holding of large equity shares in commercial, industrial, and insurance companies.
See id.
30. See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of In-
vestment Banks and Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1192 (1995) (describ-
ing the evolution of commercial and investment banking activities in the United
States and indicating that, although there was no statutory prohibition, judicial de-
cisions effectively prohibited the intermingling of the two industries).
31. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 126 (stating that investment
banking activities encompass areas such as the stock market, securities, insurance,
and real estate).
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States. After the passage of the McFadden Act'2 in 1927, commercial
banks chartered by the federal government were explicitly permitted
to conduct securities activities." Consequently, commercial banks
expanded their investment banking activities significantly until the
Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed.
Congress responded to the economic depression of the 1930s by
passing the Banking Act of 1933.25 This remedial legislation accom-
plished two key goals that continue to characterize the nation's
banking laws today.36 First, the legislature divorced commercial
banking from investment banking by enacting the Glass Steagall Act,
a portion of the Banking Act of 1933."' The underlying justification
for this separation was the promotion of bank soundness."' Second,
32. See McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
33. See Casey K. McGarvey, Federal Regulation of Bank Securities Activities:
Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall to be Shattered?, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 99, 103-
04 (1986) (stating that Section 2(b) of the McFadden Act implicitly allowed na-
tional banks to conduct investment activities under the authority of the Comptroller
of the Currency).
34. See Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for
Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING L.J. 446, 451(1998) (noting that in 1927
the McFadden Act explicitly authorized commercial banks to purchase and sell
marketable debt instruments, and that the Comptroller of the Currency also per-
mitted commercial banks to underwrite all debt securities and the banks' affiliates
to underwrite both debt and equities).
35. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
36. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 22 (affirming that the antiquated
Glass Steagall Act provisions still prevail in the American financial system today).
37. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Glass Steagall Act is the popular name given
to Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 and those provisions are
codified respectively as amended at 12 U.S.C. Sections 24 (seventh), 377, 378(a),
78 (1994). See id.
38. See Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of In-
ternational Bank Regulatory and Supervisor
, 
Convergence: A New Regulatory-
Market "Partnership", 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 227, 259-60 (1997) (explaining
that during the Great Depression in 1933, a subcommittee of the United States
Senate Banking Committee held a series of hearings during which many prominent
speakers alleged abuse in the securities activities of commercial banks and their
1999] 1723
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the legislature created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"). 9 The FDIC was also established to foster bank soundness
by providing federal deposit insurance to all national banks and
qualifying state-charted commercial banks.40
The Glass Steagall Act, the more important statute for the pur-
poses of this Comment, consists of four interrelated provisions: sec-
tions 16, 20, 21, and 32. Essentially, sections 16 and 21 prevent
commercial and investment banks from encroaching upon one an-
other's territory.4' Specifically, section 1642 prohibits commercial
banks from engaging in certain areas of the securities business, while
section 2141 proscribes securities firms from engaging in commercial
banking activities, such as the business of deposit-taking.44 Addition-
affiliates, and concluded that such abuse was the primary catalyst behind the col-
lapse of the American banking industry and the failure of over forty percent of all
domestic commercial banks between 1929 and 1933).
39. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 22 (observing that the Banking Act
of 1933 established federal deposit insurance for designated members of the Fed-
eral Reserve System and created the FDIC to supervise the system).
40. See id. at 54 (explaining that bank runs and panics, such as those that oc-
curred during the Great Depression, are rare today because federal deposit insur-
ance insures accounts at qualified banks up to $100,000 per depositor per institu-
tion).
41. See id. at 497 (suggesting that Sections 16 and 21 be thought of as limiting
the opportunities for commercial and investment banks to cross territorial lines).
42. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 24 (1994) (proscribing national banks from underwrit-
ing, selling, and dealing in specified securities).
43. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 378 (1994) (forbidding investment banks or persons en-
gaged in investment banking activities from receiving deposits, and thus from con-
ducting commercial banking activities).
44. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 262 (recognizing that section 21 of
the Glass Steagall Act proscribes any individual involved in the business of issu-
ing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from simultaneously conduct-
ing deposit-taking activities). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237,
237 (1992) (explaining that, notwithstanding the Glass Steagall Act, investment
banks have penetrated traditional commercial banking functions, such as deposit
taking via a deposit equivalent called a nondeposit deposit). A nondeposit deposit
is an account that functions like a checking account deposit, but is not classified as
a deposit for federal deposit insurance purposes or Federal Reserve Board capital
reserve requirements. See id. This article argues that the nondeposit deposit is an
1724 [14:1715
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ally, sections 32 and 20 limit affiliations between commercial and
investment banks. Section 32 prohibits the sharing of staff or man-
agement across the commercial banking and investment banking in-
dustries, 6 while section 20 regulates affiliations between firms par-
ticipating in commercial and investment banking. ' Collectively,
Congress intended these four sections to create a solid legal barrier,
separating the investment and commercial banking industries.' Con-
gress designed this separation during the 1933 hearings on banking
reform, just prior to passing the Banking Act of 1933. At the hear-
ings, Congress concluded that such a separation would prevent the
emergence of the "subtle hazards" that it attributed to the commin-
• • 49
gling of the two industries.
During its first thirty years of existence, the Glass Steagall Act
remained substantially untouched. 0 In the mid-1960s, however,
commercial banks and regulators refocused their efforts on the secu-
rities industry in order to broaden national bank powers.' Despite
oxymoron in banking law because it serves a commercial banking purpose, while
not being subjected to the expensive regulatory framework traditionally applicable
to such a service. See id.
45. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 497 (observing that sections 32 and
20 were intended to curb contact between commercial and investment banks).
46. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 78 (1994) (prohibiting a person involved in any manner
with the business of investment banking from acting as an officer, director, or em-
ployee of a FDIC member bank).
47. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 377 (1994) (prohibiting affiliations between any Federal
Reserve member bank and companies principally engaged in the issue, flotation,
public sale, underwriting, or distribution of any type of security).
48. See Shull & White, supra note 34, at 451-52 (remarking that Congress re-
voked the securities powers that the McFadden Act of 1927 accorded commercial
banks by passing the Glass Steagall provisions of the Banking Act of 1933).
49. See generally Joan M. LeGraw & Stacey L. Davidson, Note, Glass-Steagall
and the "Subtle Hazards " of Judicial Activism, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 225 (1989)
(describing the 1933 Congressional hearings on banking reform and the subtle
hazards that justified change in the industry).
50. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 263 (explaining that entry into the
securities industry was not particularly appealing to commercial banks because
many securities firms failed with the banks).
51. See id. (discussing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's chal-
lenge of the Glass Steagall Act's restrictions on two occasions).
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these efforts, the attempt to expand the banks' powers ultimately
failed.12 In effect, in 1971, the United States Supreme Court, in In-
vestment Company Institute v. Camp, 3 reiterated the 1933 congres-
sional hearing's subtle hazards justification 4 for the Glass Steagall
Act's separation of commercial and investment banking activities."
B. THE PRESENT POWERS AND FIREWALLS OF AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Although the Glass Steagall Act created a wall that separates
commercial from investment banking, this wall is not impenetrable. 6
The first loosening of the strictures came with the creation of entities
known as Bank Holding Companies ("BHCs")." Given that these
52. See id. (demonstrating that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
ultimately failed in its effort to reform the Glass Steagall Act during the 1960s).
53. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
54. See id. at 630-37 (supporting Congress' subtle hazards rationale). The sub-
tle hazards that occur when a commercial bank enters into the business of invest-
ment banking directly or indirectly through an affiliate include: (1) an adverse ef-
fect on public confidence if the bank or affiliate performs poorly because of the
association in the mind of the public; (2) the risk of unsound loans to the ailing af-
filiate in an effort to raise public confidence; (3) the risk that the bank may provide
credit more freely to companies in which the affiliate has a vested interest; (4) the
risk that the bank may act more as a salesman rather than as an unbiased source of
credit; (5) diminished customer goodwill if losses are incurred because of the af-
filiate; (6) loss of reputation for prudence and restraint because of investment
banking needs; (7) temptation to make loans merely to facilitate the purchase of
more securities; and (8) conflicts of interest between the need to offer impartial
advice as a commercial bank and the salesman's interest as an investment bank.
See id. at 631-33.
55. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 264 (remarking that the Investment
Company Institute. v. Camp decision provided American courts and the federal
banking legislators with the flexibility to analyze a range of factors when deter-
mining whether to permit a commercial bank to engage in non-traditional banking
activities under the Glass Steagall Act).
56. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 523 (declaring that banking firms
persist in making inroads into the business of investment companies).
57. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 74 (explaining that the creation of
entities known as holding companies defeated the intended purpose of the Glass
Steagall Act, which was to separate the commercial and investment banking in-
dustries).
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new entities were not banks, they were not implicated or limited by
the Glass Steagall Act's proscriptions.' Consequently, BHCs freely
purchased both commercial and investment banks and ultimately
served to circumvent the mandates of the Glass Steagall Act."
In response to the new BHC entities, Congress enacted The Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA")foand closed a major loop-
hole in the Glass Steagall provisions by requiring BHCs"' to divest
themselves of non-banking interests. 2 The general rule of the BHCA
is that a BHC is prohibited from acquiring direct or indirect control
over a company that is not a bank."' This general rule, however, is
subject to numerous exceptions.'
The most important exception to the general rule of the BHCA is
set forth in section 4(c)(8).65 Section 4(c)(8) states that the Federal
Reserve Board ("FRB") may permit a BHC to acquire or control a
non-banking company if its activities are "so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
58. See id. (commenting that holding companies were not banks and conse-
quently were not subject to the same parameters of the Glass Steagall Act, under
which banks had to function).
59. See id. (observing that the Glass Steagall Act could not prevent BHCs from
purchasing both commercial and investment banks).
60. 12 U.S.C. sec. 1841-1850 (1994). Congress passed the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 to restrict and regulate the increasing number of BHCs and
defined a BHC as a corporation capable of voting a 25 percent share of two or
more banks. See LEwis & PESCETTO, supra note I, at 74.
61. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1841(a) (1994) (defining a BHC as any company con-
trolling a bank or a company that is currently or will become a BHC under the aus-
pices of the BHCA).
62. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 264 (observing that the stated pur-
pose of the BHCA was to require BHCs to divest themselves of non-banking inter-
ests).
63. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1843(a) (providing that any company that acquires a
bank has two years to divest itself of its non-banking components).
64. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1843(c) (setting forth fourteen exemptions to the general
rule prohibiting BHCs from acquiring control over an entity that is not a bank).
65. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 265 (identifying section 4(c)(8) as
the main vehicle through which BHCs conduct securities activities).
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thereto."" Accordingly, section 4(c)(8) serves as an avenue through
which BHCs may conduct securities-related activities in their non-
bank, or section 20 subsidiaries. 6 Thus, this framework enabled
BHCs, with both banking and non-banking subsidiaries, to signifi-
68cantly increase their securities activities.
To protect FDIC-insured commercial banks from the risks associ-
ated with expanded securities underwriting and dealing activities
within the BHC structure, in 1987 and 1989 the FRB created twenty-
eight restrictions, commonly known as section 20 firewalls. 69 These
firewalls ° constituted legal barriers insulating the traditional com-
mercial bank from the riskier activities of its securities affiliates.'
The FRB intended the firewalls to foster a legal framework of corpo-
rate independence and to shelter commercial banks from their non-
bank affiliates' more speculative ventures.72 To achieve this end, the
firewalls placed limitations on financial transactions and on the cir-
66. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1843(c)(8) (delineating that the FRB must, when deter-
mining whether a specific activity is properly incident to the business of banking
or to the management or control of banks, balance the potential benefits to the
public, such as increased convenience, heightened competition, or gains in effi-
ciency, against the possible negative effects, such as excessive concentration of
resources, reduced or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsafe banking
practices).
67. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 265 n. 124 (stating that a BHC's sub-
sidiaries are bank affiliates within the meaning of section 20 subsidiaries).
68. See id. at 265 (describing section 4(c)(8) as the most significant exception
to the BHCA).
69. See Developments in Banking Law: 1997, supra note 5, at 95-6 (indicating
that the FRB created restrictions intended to eliminate the risk of securities activi-
ties being imposed on FDIC-insured banks, and that these twenty-eight restrictions
were commonly called section 20 firewalls).
70. See Legislative Proposals to Restructure Our Financial System: Hearings
on S. 186, S. 1891, and S. 1995 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 93 (1988) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chair-
man, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 74 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 91, 96 (1988) (defining "firewalls" as barriers created to insulate
banks from the risks associated with the securities industry).
71. See SHULL & WHITE, supra note 34, at 458-59.
72. See id.
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culation of information within the BHC structure." In 1997, how-
ever, the FRB discarded most of the section 20 firewalls that previ-
ously had protected a BHC's commercial bank from its securities ac-
tivities.7'
Outside of the BHC framework, the securities activities of com-
mercial banks also expanded due to liberal interpretations of the
Glass Steagall Act by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"). 75 The OCC permits commercial banks to engage in an ex-
pansive array of securities and securities-related activities, such as
the underwriting of United States government, state, and municipal
76
obligations. At present, the only two significant banking activities
that national commercial banks appear to be proscribed from engag-
ing in are the general underwriting of securities that are not their
own, and the purchasing of equity and other bank-ineligible securi-
ties for their own accounts."
In sum, judicial deference to aggressive regulatory decisions"'
permitting increased securities activities by commercial banks and
BHCs, combined with the erosion of the protective firewalls, has fu-
eled the defacto disintegration of the Glass Steagall wall - a wall
that was designed to prevent commercial banks from engaging in se-
73. See id.
74. See Developments in Banking Law: 1997, supra note 5, at 102-03 (recog-
nizing that the FRB abandoned almost all of the section 20 firewalls that separated
a BHC's securities subsidiary from its depository institution and discussing what
little remains of the section 20 firewalls).
75. See NORTON & OLIVE, supra note 38, at 277 (observing that the OCC's lib-
eral interpretation of what constitutes the business of banking enables national
banks to engage in expanded securities activities).
76. See id. at 268-72 (setting forth an expansive list of permitted securities ac-
tivities for commercial banks).
77. See id. at 271 (analyzing the permissible activities list for commercial
banks).
78. See generally NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995) (permitting a deferential stance toward OCC's reading of federal banking
laws and its interpretation of which activities are closely related to banking);
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (according deference to the
regulatory agencies' interpretations of which activities are closely related to bank-
ing).
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curities activities altogether.79 The aforementioned developments in
the financial services industry underscore the necessity that Congress
move swiftly to reform the nation's banking laws. Given that the
European Union has committed itself to the deregulation and har-
monization of its financial services industry over the past few dec-
ades,8° an analysis of its regulatory framework could provide the
American banking industry with insight into a more liberal banking
system - a system where banks are permitted to offer corporations
and consumers a broader selection of services in both commercial
and investment banking.81
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING
COMMERCIAL BANKING AND
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL
BANKING BY THE SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957,2 the European
Union83 has concentrated on the deregulation and harmonization of
79. See Why the Magna Bank Case is so Significant, supra note 20 (asserting
that continued delay in financial reform by Congress will result in a marketplace
that evolves haphazardly according to institutional preferences and turf concerns of
federal regulators).
80. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 7 (observing that the European
Union has focused its efforts on deregulating and harmonizing the financial serv-
ices industry since the 1957 Treaty of Rome). Beginning in the mid-1970s, it fo-
cused on harmonizing financial regulation. Id. at 7-8.
81. See id. at 192 (identifying economies of scope and greater economic devel-
opment as benefits that result from the European Union's Universal banking sys-
tem).
82. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], art. I (uniting six Euro-
pean countries to form the EEC: Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands).
83. See id. (establishing the European Economic Community). In 1986, the
European Community enacted the Single European Act and declared as its objec-
tive the establishment of European unity. See Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986,
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its financial services industry." To attain this objective, the Treaty of
Rome provided the European Commission "' with the authority to
pass regulations and directives, to make decisions and recommenda-
tions, and to issue opinions. 6 With these expansive powers, from
1957 through 1973 the European Union concentrated on deregulating
the process of entry into domestic financial markets to foster a level
playing field in the financial services industry.v Notwithstanding this
deregulatory action, the lack of uniformity in banking supervisory
laws continued to stymie international competition." In response, the
1987 O.J. Eur. Comm. (L 169) 1, 4 (1987), 2 C.M.L.R. 741, 742 (1987), 25 I.L.M.
503, 507 (1986). Finally, on November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union
took effect and is commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. See Treaty of the
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 1 C.M.L.R. 719. The treaty
announced that the members would no longer be called the European Community,
but would be referred to as the European Union. See id. art. A. at 5. For consis-
tency, the term European Union will be used throughout this Comment.
84. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 7 (identifying the deregulation and
harmonization of financial services in the EEC as a key goal of the Treaty of
Rome).
85. See id. (stating that the European Commission has been taking measures to
deregulate and harmonize the supply of financial services in the European Union
since 1957). In 1965, the Merger Treaty was signed, establishing a single Council
and a single Commission of the European Union, now referred to as the European
Commission. See Treaty Establishing A Single Council and a Single Commission
of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, O.J. (L 152) 1 (1965), 4 I.L.M. 776
[hereinafter Merger Treaty]. The Council is the chief legislative body of the Euro-
pean Union and represents the concerns of the Member states. See id. The Euro-
pean Commission is the European Union's chief administrative body. See id.
European Commission members are civil servants who do not accept orders from
their respective country's governments. See id.
86. See EEC Treaty, supra note 82, art. 189 (as amended) (stating that regula-
tions shall apply generally, be binding in all respects and be directly applicable
within each Member State; directives shall bind any Member States they address,
while respecting the competence of domestic agencies regarding form and means;
decisions shall bind in every aspect the addressee named therein; recommendations
and opinions have no authority to bind).
87. See LEWIS & PESCETrO, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining that the deregulation
of commercial banks' entry into domestic financial markets culminated in the
adoption of a 1973 Council directive based on the principle of national treatment to
promote equal treatment of commercial banks in the European Union).
88. See id. (commenting that the lack of coordination in banking regulations
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European Union refocused its efforts on the coordination of regula-
tions within its financial system.89
The adoption of the First Banking Directive" by the European
Commission in 1977 constituted the European Union's first major
attempt to harmonize European banking laws.9' The First Banking
Directive consists of several provisions that significantly reformed
the financial services industry in the European Union for credit in-
stitutions, also known as commercial banks.92 The key provisions of
the First Banking Directive can be categorized into five general
groups for harmonization purposes: (1) rules eliminating banking
service barriers along Member State borders; (2) rules promoting the
free establishment of branches by European credit institutions in
other Member States; (3) uniform rules for key authorization re-
quirements for credit institutions; (4) uniform rules for key supervi-
sory standards; and (5) rules mandating equal treatment of non-
European Union credit institutions.93
Although the First Banking Directive sought to liberalize the
banking laws of the European Union, it continued to restrict Inter-
continued to restrict international competition).
89. See id. at 7-8 (highlighting the European Union's redirected interest in the
unification of financial regulations).
90. See Council Directive 77/780 of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of
the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up
and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30 [hereinafter
First Banking Directive] (reforming the European Union's banking laws).
91. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 8 (asserting that the First Banking
Directive paved the way to more current harmonization of banking regulations).
92. See First Banking Directive, supra note 90, art. 1 (defining a credit institu-
tion as an entity that receives deposits from the public and that offers credit for its
own account); see also George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992: Legal
Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 463, 478-79 (1990) (com-
menting that this definition encompasses financial institutions such as commercial
banks and savings institutions).
93. See Michael Gruson & Werner Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of
the European Economic Community and Its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 205, 207-08 (1989) (organizing the First Banking Directive
provisions, which created the basis for the harmonizing of banking laws in the
EEC, into five categories).
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Member State banking services in certain respects.94 For example,
under the First Banking Directive, a host country could impose its
authorization procedures on a credit institution seeking to set up a
branch in that Member State. Each Member State was also permitted
to maintain and impose domestic activity restrictions on a credit in-
stitution establishing a branch within its territory.9' Thus, while the
First Banking Directive constituted a significant first step towards fi-
nancial reform, further action was needed to completely liberalize the
European Union's banking laws. 96
In 1989, the European Union ultimately adopted its Second
Banking Directive with the key goals of eliminating the remaining
obstacles to the free establishment of bank branches and fostering
complete liberty to provide financial services throughout the Euro-
pean Union.97 Today, the Second Banking Directive is the governing
law on financial services in the European Union." The current direc-
tive creates a single passport" for banks to supply services through-
out the European Union, and achieves this goal by permitting banks
to provide an extensive list of banking services, subject to home
94. See id. at 208-09 (asserting that the First Banking Directive constituted
only a preliminary step towards eliminating the need for host country authorization
to conduct banking activities in the European Union).
95. See id. at 209-10 (indicating that barriers to the establishment of credit in-
stitution branches in other European Union Member States remained after the
adoption of the First Banking Directive).
96. See id. (citing three legal barriers preventing Member states from estab-
lishing branches throughout the European Union even after the first Banking Di-
rective: (1) host country authorization; (2) host country supervision; and (3) in
most Member states, the requirement that branches, like new banks, be given
specified endowment capital).
97. See id. at 210 (emphasizing that the goal of the Second Banking Directive
is to foster a genuinely internal marketplace of banking services).
98. See LEws & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 9 tbl. 1.1 (listing financial services
directives implemented into law and recommendations issued from 1979 to 1995).
The European Union issued the Second Banking Directive in 1989 and imple-
mented it into law on January 1, 1993. Id. at 9.
99. See id. at 12-13 (indicating that a key feature of the Second Banking Direc-
tive is the creation of a single license for banks to offer services throughout the
European Union).
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country control and uniform standards across national borders.'°°
In contrast to the American banking regime, the Second Banking
Directive was founded on the universal banking model, which allows
a bank to transact commercial and investment banking functions
within the same corporate entity.'"' The European Union embraced
three key concepts in its Second Banking Directive to achieve this
universal banking throughout the Union: (1) mutual recognition; (2)
a single banking license; and (3) an agreed-upon list of banking ac-
tivities.
0 2
First, mutual recognition mandates that if a service can be pro-
vided legally under specific conditions in one European Union
country, it cannot be proscribed under similar conditions in another
European Union country.' 3 Second, the single banking license pro-
vides that once a bank is licensed by the proper authorities in its
home country to engage in certain activities, it is permitted to trans-
act those same activities in any other Member State under the single
100. See id. (listing the three types of directives that affected the European sin-
gle market of financial services: (1) Capital Liberalization Directive; (2) Directives
for Credit Institutions; and (3) Directives For Investment Services and Capital
Adequacy).
101. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 28, at Annex List of Activities
Subject to Mutual Recognition (identifying the securities activities that a credit in-
stitution may engage in, such as: trading for its own account or for the account of
customers in long and short term securities; issuing of shares and related activities;
managing of a portfolio and some investment banking activities, including those
relating to mergers and acquisitions).
102. See Zavvos, supra note 92, at 481-82 (identifying three financial services
models in the European Union prior to the implementation of the Second Banking
Directive: (1) a universal banking model common to Germany and the Nether-
lands, in which commercial banks are licensed to participate in the securities serv-
ices and a broad array of other financial services; (2) a hybrid model, which was
common to the United Kingdom, France, and Greece, in which a bank's commer-
cial banking and securities activities are separated by Chinese walls; and (3) the
Belgian system, which strictly limits bank engagement in securities activities). The
European Union viewed the adoption of mutual recognition, the single banking li-
cense, and the agreed-upon activities list as a means by which the Second Banking
Directive could move all European Union countries towards Germany's universal
banking model. See id.
103. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 12-13 (describing the principle of
mutual recognition).
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banking license.'06 Moreover, the single banking license is valid re-
gardless of whether the activities are permitted in the host country,
thereby eliminating the need to obtain a local banking license or
authorization. 5 Finally, Article 18(1) of the Second Banking Direc-
tive provides that European Union countries must allow the activities
listed in the Annex to the Directive to be carried on within their ter-
ritories and that those activities are covered by home state authoriza-
tion.'0 6
The consequences of the application of these three principles are
significant. Essentially, one country's bank may gain a competitive
advantage over another country's bank by providing the domestic
customers with products that domestic banks are proscribed from of-
fering, but that are permitted by the Second Banking Directive.'
Thus, the regulatory body of the more restrictive country will have a
strong incentive to level the playing field for its domestic banks by
liberalizing its own regulations."" The end result is that regulatory
agencies of each country in the European Union engage in competi-
tive deregulation of the financial services industry.'09
104. See id. (observing that the implementation of the single banking license
amounts to the mutual recognition of regulatory bodies regarding the Second
Banking Directive's list of agreed-upon activities).
105. See id. at 12 (explaining that the Second Banking Directive embodies the
philosophy that once a bank is permitted to conduct activities in its home country,
it is also permitted to conduct those same activities in any European Union Mem-
ber State, without the need for further permission).
106. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 28, art. 18(1) (mandating that
Member States permit all the activities listed in the Annex to be conducted within
their territories, in conformity with Articles 19-21).
107. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting the competitive ad-
vantage a country fostering a more liberal banking regime may attain within the
European Union).
108. See id. at 13 (highlighting the incentive structure of the Second Banking
Directive).
109. See id. (describing the phenomenon of competitive deregulation within the
European Union).
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B. THE PRESENT POWERS AND FIREWALLS OF EUROPEAN
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Compared to the current regulatory structure in the United States,
European credit institutions, or commercial banks, enjoy expansive
powers under the Second Banking Directive." ° The Directive's An-
nex sets forth the present powers of commercial banks in the Euro-
pean Union,"' which are deemed integral to banking and for which,
consequently, the single banking and mutual recognition principles
will apply." 2 Most notably, commercial banks in the European Union
are permitted to engage in trading for their own account, or for the
account of their customers in securities, and are able to participate in
share issuances and services related to such issues."3
110. See id. at 192 (stating that the United States' banking regulatory structure is
the most restrictive of major industrialized countries).
111. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 28, at Annex List of Activities
Subject to Mutual Recognition (establishing expansive powers for credit institu-
tions in the European Union).
112. See id. (allowing banks to trade for their own account or for the accounts of
their clients).
113. See id. (listing fourteen activities that can be conducted by any commercial
bank within the European Union). The permissible activities are:
1. Accepting deposits and other repayable funds from the
public.
2. Lending.
3. Financial leasing.
4. Money transmission services.
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g. credit
cards, travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts).
6. Guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
a. money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, etc.);
b. foreign exchange;
c. financial futures and options;
d. exchange and interest rate instruments;
e. transferable securities.
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The Annex's list of permissible activities demonstrates that the
Second Banking Directive explicitly permits commercial banks to
enter into the securities business, and allows such activities to be
conducted by the same corporate entity."' Thus, the American notion
of firewalls separating the traditional banking activities of a bank
from its securities operations does not exist under the European Un-
ion's banking regime."'
The European Union's liberal policy regarding securities activities
highlights a fundamental difference in the premises upon which the
European Union and the United States have based their respective
banking laws." 6 While the United States traditionally has viewed the
entry of commercial banks into expanded securities activities as in-
creasing the risk to the health of the depository institution,'" the
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of services
related to such issues.
9.Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial
strategy and related questions and advice and services re-
lating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings.
10. Money brokering.
11. Portfolio management and advice.
12. Safekeeping and administering securities.
13. Credit reference services.
14. Safe custody services.
Id.
114. See LEWIs & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 92 (indicating that many coun-
tries, especially those in Europe, have increased their competitive edge through
universal banking institutions, which allow a corporation to take care of all of its
banking needs in one place).
115. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 722-23 (explaining that the bank or
financial services holding structure is unique to the American banking industry and
that under the European Union's universal banking model any entity with a bank-
ing license may hold large equity shares in commercial, insurance, and industrial
companies).
116. See Zavvos, supra note 92, at 481 (stating that European banks' entry into
the securities business indicates the different premises upon which European Un-
ion and United States banking laws are based).
117. See LeGraw & Davidson, supra note 49, at 226 (explaining the traditional
view that the risky and speculative nature of investment banking makes it undesir-
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European Union's viewpoint is that such diversification actually de-
creases the risk."8 The European Union concluded that allowing
commercial banks to participate in the securities industry diversifies
their activities and thereby secures bank earnings when the tradi-
tional banking activities are less lucrative."9 In sum, the European
Union views the adoption of the universal banking model as a means
of improving its competitive position in the global marketplace,'20
III. MOVEMENT TOWARDS EXPANDED
SECURITIES POWERS FOR AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL BANKS
A. OVERALL MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BANKING REFORM
In contrast to the European Union's innovative Second Banking
Directive, the American banking industry is currently approaching
the twenty-first century in a regulatory vehicle conceived in 1933.2,
Accordingly, many top executives of domestic financial institutions
lament that other countries are leaving the United States behind as
the only developed country that has not lifted barriers segregating fi-
nancial services. H.R. 10, the Financial Services Act of 1999, em-
able to commingle investment bank activities with commercial banks that are re-
sponsible for public savings).
118. See Zavvos, supra note 92, at 481 (commenting that the European Union
believes that diversification, through participation in the securities industry, adds
depth and liquidity to European banks).
119. See id. (noting the European Union's view that the securities activities of
banks help banks maintain overall earnings when the conventional banking busi-
ness is suffering from decreased profits).
120. See id. (contending that the adoption of the universal banking model by the
European Union will increase its competitive position in the global marketplace
because the European Union lacks nonbank securities houses, like those in the
United States, and the European banks are the only institutions strong enough to
provide capital for a modem securities market).
121. See Glass Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (preventing the affiliation among securities firms,
insurance companies, and depository institutions; and legally segregating these fi-
nancial services).
122. See Deborah McGregor, Congress is Pressed on Bank Reform, FIN. TIMES,
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bodies Congress' most recent response to the industry officials' cries
for reform.13 This proposed legislation aspires to create a framework
that facilitates more efficient and effective competition among the
banking, securities, and insurance industries, while increasing con-
sumer access to financial services, protecting investors, and fostering
a safe and sound banking system.'24
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 10: THE PROPOSED
SECURITIES POWERS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS
The impetus behind financial reform legislation is the banking, se-
curities, and insurance industries' desire to form strategic alliances in
order to level the international banking playing field.'2 Accordingly,
the main goals of the proposed legislation are, first, to repeal the pro-
visions of the Glass Steagall Act that restrict banks and securities
underwriters from affiliating, 2 6 and, second, to permit the creation of
Feb. 11, 1999, at 3 (reporting Congress' interest in reforming the financial services
industry). David Comansky, Chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch, testified before
the House Banking Committee that the European Union has permitted its financial
institutions to cross the lines and offer banking, securities, and insurance services
and that Japan revamped its version of the antiquated Glass Steagall Act in 1998).
See id.
123. See id. (reporting that James Leach, the Republican chairman of the House
Banking Committee, asserted that he was determined to pass his current version of
H.R. 10 for changing outmoded financial services laws in 1999).
124. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (declaring that the purpose of the pro-
posed legislation is to augment competition in the financial services industry by
providing a prudent framework for the affiliation among banks, securities compa-
nies, and other financial service providers, as well as additional purposes).
125. See McGregor, supra note 122, at 3 (reporting that top officials of Ameri-
can financial institutions continue to press Congress to reform domestic banking
laws so other nations' less restrictive financial regimes will not reduce their pres-
ence in the international banking market).
126. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 101 (1999) (repealing sections 20 and 32 of
the Glass Steagall Act of 1933). Section 20 proscribes commercial banks from af-
filiating with an organization dealing in securities. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 377 (1994).
Section 32 prohibits persons employed in the securities industry from serving con-
currently as an officer, director, or employee of a commercial bank, unless specifi-
cally authorized to do so by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 78 (1994).
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financial supermarkets 27 similar to those that currently exist
abroad. 128
H.R 10 is divided into five parts. 29 Basically these provisions do
the following: Title I of the proposed legislation facilitates affiliation
among securities firms, insurance companies, and depository institu-
tions;30 Title II discusses the functional regulation of the proposed
financial conglomerates; 3' Title III incorporates the insurance com-
promise worked out among the competing industries;1 2 Title IV pro-
vides guidelines for unitary savings and loan holding companies; " '
and Title V addresses privacy issues. '34 Title I comprises the more
127. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. see. 103 (1999) (amending the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 to include financial holding companies; defining these new
entities as those that comply with the eligibility requirements set forth in the legis-
lation; and permitting the new entities to engage in any activity that the FRB has
determined to be "financial in nature or incidental to such financial activities"); see
also Clyde Mitchell, H.R. 10 - So Near and Yet So Far, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1998, at
6 (indicating that one of the primary goals of domestic financial reform was the
formation of financial supermarkets).
128. See LEWIS AND PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 126 (identifying the European
Union countries of Switzerland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as
countries in which the United States has significant investments, and noting that all
of these countries have universal-type banking systems, where one bank can offer
a wide variety of services in both commercial and investment banking).
129. See generally H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (separating the legislation into
five distinct titles).
130. See id. at tit. I (dealing with affiliations within the financial services indus-
try, streamlining supervision of financial holding companies, subsidiaries of na-
tional banks, wholesale financial holding companies and institutions, national
treatment, federal home loan bank system modernization, direct activities of banks,
and deposit insurance funds).
131. See id. at tit. II (discussing brokers and dealers, bank investment company
activities, Securities and Exchange Commission supervision of investment BHCs,
and studies to be conducted).
132. See id. at tit. III (covering state regulation of insurers, redomestication of
mutual insurance, and national association of registered agents and brokers).
133. See id. at tit. IV (preventing the creation of new savings and loan holding
companies with commercial affiliates).
134. See id. at tit. V (including a requirement that financial institutions adopt
precise privacy policies and advise their customers as to how the financial institu-
tions intend to use customers' information).
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important innovations for the purposes of this Comment because it
repeals the restrictions of the Glass Steagall Act and establishes the
regulatory framework for the proposed financial supermarkets." Ac-
cordingly, the provisions of Title I are the primary focus of greater
discussion below.
To facilitate affiliation among securities firms and depository in-
stitutions, Title I of H.R. 10 contains several principal provisions.
First, it repeals sections 20 and 32 of the Glass Steagall Act, elimi-
nating the restrictions on banks and securities underwriters from af-
filiating and sharing personnel.'3 6 Second, it creates a holding com-
pany structure by amending the BHCA' "' to include a provision
applicable to financial holding companies ("FHCs").'" Under this
new regulatory structure, companies engaged in commercial bank-
ing, investment banking, and insurance activities may be owned and
operated by a single FHC as long as the business conducted is "fi-
nancial in nature or incidental to such financial activities."'"9 Thus,
permissible non-banking activities for FHCs are expanded signifi-
cantly from those "closely related to banking"'"0 to those that are "fi-
nancial in nature. '"'
135. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. secs. 101, 111 (1999) (amending the Glass Stea-
gall Act of 1933 and creating the supervisory framework for financial conglomer-
ates).
136. See id. sec. 101 (repealing sections 20 and 32 of the Glass Steagall Act of
1933).
137. See id. sec. 102 (amending section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 and inserting after section 5 a new section 6 entitled Financial Holding
Companies).
138. See id. sec. 103 (defining a financial holding company as a BHC which
meets eligibility requirements pertaining to capitalization, management, commu-
nity needs requirements, and foreign banks and companies).
139. See id. (stating that the FRB determines whether the activity is financial in
nature, subject to Treasury Department approval, and setting forth factors to be
considered in making such an assessment).
140. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1843(c)(8) (1994) (permitting a BHC to engage in a new
activity if it is judged by the FRB to be so closely related to the banking business
or the management or control of banks as to be deemed a proper incident thereof).
141. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (enumerating factors to be con-
sidered by the FRB in determining whether an activity is financial in nature). Such
factors include the purposes of the Financial Services Act of 1999, changes or rea-
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Third, the proposed legislation contains a list of specifically
authorized financial activities. 142 If an activity is not mentioned on the
list, the FRB may permit the FHC to conduct the additional activity
if the FRB determines that the new activity is financial in nature.' 41 In
reaching its decision, H.R. 10 requires the FRB to consult with the
sonably anticipated changes in the marketplace or the technology for delivering
financial services, and whether such activity is necessary to enable a BHC or FHC
to compete effectively with any financial service company in the United States).
See id.
142. See id. (listing activities considered financial in nature). Activities consid-
ered financial in nature, in which FHCs will be able to engage, include:
1. Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or
safeguarding money or securities.
2. Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm,
damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing and issu-
ing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for
purposes of the foregoing.
3. Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory
services, including advising an investment company.
4. Issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools
of assets permissible for a bank to hold directly.
5. Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities.
6. Engaging in any activity that the Board has determined, by
order or regulation that is in effect on the date of enactment
of the Financial Services Act of 1999, to be so closely re-
lated ....
7. Engaging, in the United States, in any activity that
i. a bank holding company may engage in outside the
United States;
and
ii. the Board has determined.., to be usual in connection
with the transaction of banking or other financial opera-
tions abroad.
8. Directly or indirectly acquiring or controlling [a company]
engaged in any activity not authorized pursuant to this sec-
tion .... Id.
143. See id. sec. 103(c)(2) (citing factors the FRB should consider in making its
determination of what activities are financial in nature).
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Treasury,'" which has the ultimate authority to veto a FRB determi-
nation.'
45
Fourth, H.R. 10 designates the FRB as the umbrella regulator'" of
these FHCs, with functional regulation of the commercial banks, in-
vestment banks, and insurance companies in the structure delegated
to the appropriate regulator.47 Commercial banking activities would
be subject to functional regulation by the OCC, the FDIC, or the ap-
propriate state-banking department.' The Securities and Exchange
Commission would oversee investment banking activities,'' and the
state insurance regulator would supervise insurance activities.""
The financial reform legislation purports to streamline FHC super-
vision in two ways. First, H.R. 10 directs the FRB to depend, to the
greatest extent possible, on reports the FHC has prepared for func-
tional regulators,15' and, second, it limits examinations of function-
ally-regulated subsidiaries to circumstances in which the FRB has
144. See id. sec. 103(c)(1)(B) (mandating that the FRB shall consult with the
Treasury Department concerning any application, request, or proposal to have an
activity declared financial in nature).
145. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (indicating that the Treasury's
view is supreme regarding what activities are financial).
146. See id. sec. 111 (giving the FRB the authority to collect reports from BHC
and FHCs, and to conduct examinations of the entity); see also Mitchell, supra
note 127, at 3 (explaining that the 105th Congress' proposed legislation designated
the FRB as the umbrella regulator).
147. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 111 (1999) (directing the FRB to rely upon
reports submitted to the other federal and state supervisors or to the appropriate
self-regulatory agencies to the fullest extent possible).
148. See id. (stating that the FRB shall accord deference to bank examinations
and reports of depository institutions made by the appropriate federal and state de-
pository institution regulatory authority).
149. See id. (mandating that functional regulation of the securities activities of
the BHC or FHC will be deferred to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the relevant State securities authorities).
150. See id. (delegating functional regulation of insurance activities to the appli-
cable State insurance authorities).
151. See id. (stating that the FRB must accept reports that the FHC has submit-
ted to other federal and state supervisors or to appropriate self-regulatory organi-
zations that fulfill the FRB's reporting requirements).
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reasonable cause to believe an affiliated depository institution is
facing material risk.'52 Finally, to protect the overall safety and
soundness of the FHC, H.R. 10 authorizes the FRB to impose pru-
dential safeguards on transactions and relationships between a de-
pository institution and its affiliates.'53 H.R. 10 indicates that those
safeguards should be designed to eliminate hazards such as conflicts
of interest and undue encroachment upon consumer privacy.14 Addi-
tionally, the FRB's authority to impose restrictions upon the non-
bank affiliates of the FHC is limited to what is necessary to prevent
or rectify unsafe or unsound practices posing a material risk to the
safety or soundness of the depository or payment system.'5'
C. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS: IS H.R. 10 A COMPROMISE
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE
AND THE UNITED STATES' CURRENT BANKING SYSTEM?
The European Union's Second Banking Directive provides a good
basis for comparison with the current movement in banking reform
in the United States for several reasons. First, the United States iden-
tified the amelioration of its competitive position internationally as
one of the principle goals of banking reform." 6 Second, the European
Union is the forerunner in banking reform, currently maintaining the
152. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 111 (1999) (granting the FRB the authority
to examine each subsidiary of a BHC or FHC). The FRB may only make such ex-
aminations when there is reasonable cause to believe that the subsidiary is acting in
a manner that may pose a material risk to an affiliated depository institution or in a
way suggesting non-compliance with the mandates of the Financial Services Act of
1999). See id.
153. See id. sec. 114 (identifying public interest as a proper reason for which the
FRB may impose restrictions or requirements on the affiliation between a deposi-
tory institution and its non-bank affiliates).
154. See id. (citing additional purposes for imposing restrictions, such as en-
hancing the financial stability of banks, avoiding significant risk to the safety and
soundness of the depository institution or any federal deposit insurance fund, and
promoting the application of national treatment and equality of competitive op-
portunity).
155. See id. (setting forth the standard for the FRB's exercise of authority).
156. See generally H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (identifying the enhancement of
the competitive position of American financial service providers internationally as
one purpose of the proposed legislation).
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most liberal financial system in the world."' Finally, the European
Union has several years of experience in implementing its deregu-
lated and reformed system of universal banking'"9 to which the
United States can look for guidance.
In beginning the comparative analysis, it is important to recognize
the major policy difference between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union concerning the degree of safety built into their respective
financial systems. While the European Union has integrated minimal
protections in its Second Banking Directive, " ' the United States
maintains an expansive system of protection and appears to continue
at such a level in the prospective financial reform legislation. 'o With
this policy distinction in mind, there is a notable divergence in
American and European banking reform. Both the European Union
and the United States seek to improve their global competitive posi-
tions. In terms of universal banking, however, American authorities,
through H.R. 10, have proposed the so-called firewall or FHC ap-
proach,6' while the European Union, in its Second Banking Direc-
tive, has fostered the liberal German universal banking model.' "
The American holding company approach enables the bank entity
of a FHC to participate in securities activities, "while maintaining a
157. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 723 (commenting that Germany's
and the European Union's universal banking model is debatably the most freestyle
banking model in the world).
158. See generally Joko A. SANTOS, COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE SECURITIES
BUSINESS: A REvIEw (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Monetary and Econ. Dep't,
Working Paper No. 56, 1998) (highlighting the major benefits of a liberal universal
banking system, and looking to the examples of various European Union countries
to bolster the argument).
159. See LEWIs & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 189 (contrasting the European
Union's conservative safety net in banking legislation with the more extensive
system of protection present in the United States).
160. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (permitting more expansive fi-
nancial activities to be conducted within the segregated structure of a FHC).
161. See id. (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to include
FHCs).
162. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 724 (explaining that the European
Union's implementation of the universal banking model in its Second Banking Di-
rective encourages German-style banking throughout Europe).
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structure that insulates its banking activities from the greater risks of
securities trading.' 63 In contrast, the European Union approach per-
mits banks to conduct both commercial banking and securities ac-
tivities without these protective firewalls.' 6 Essentially, rather than
restricting specific banking activities or mandating financial segre-
gation through a holding company structure with firewalls, the Euro-
pean Union's regulations establish minimum standards of conduct
and minimum requirements for the financial indices of stability.'6 '
One criticism of the proposed American FHC approach is that such a
change does not truly revolutionize the domestic banking industry
because banks will not be able to take advantage of expanded pow-
ers, given the inevitable result that most, if not all, of the benefits of
diversification will accrue to the FHC and not to the banks.
166
In sum, Congress has proposed legislation that strives to enhance
the international competitiveness of domestic banks without first
thoroughly analyzing what has enabled the European Union's uni-
versal banks to perform so successfully and to become daunting
competitors to American banking institutions. 7 The proposed finan-
163. LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 189; see also H.R. 10, 106th Cong.
sec. 114 (1999) (empowering the FRB to enact prudential safeguards affecting the
relationship between a FHC or BHC and an affiliated bank to prevent significant
risk to the safety and soundness of the depository institution).
164. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 723-24 (indicating that in the Ger-
man or European Union universal banking model there are few separate legal enti-
ties, banks frequently hold commercial firms, and combinations of banking and
insurance are common).
165. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 189 (explaining that the European
Union opted for regulations imposing minimum standards for credit institutions
rather than restricting the types of activities in which banks could engage).
166. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 554 (questioning whether Alan
Greenspan's proposal for the holding company structure as the means of achieving
benefits from diversification into the securities industry would actually result in
banks taking advantage of the additional powers, or whether such benefits would
simply be enjoyed by the holding company); see also Shull & White, supra note
34, at 460 (commenting that the complete isolation of banks, as in a holding com-
pany structure, would undermine the main reason activity expansion has been
sought out in financial reform, namely, to enable banks to benefit from economies
of scope and diversification).
167. See SANTOS, supra note 158, at 8 (finding that research on banks in Japan,
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cial reform legislation arguably does no more than repeal the Glass
Steagall Act, while maintaining the currently fragmented, segregated,
and protective structure of the BHCA, which grew out of a loophole
in the Glass Steagall Act in 1956.66 Consequently, the current
movement of financial reform in the United States has struck a com-
promise between the revolutionary model of the European Union's
Second Banking Directive and the current, highly regulated model of
the American holding company structure. Basically, the following
could result from the proposed financial reform legislation: on the
one hand, American FHCs will be permitted to offer a more expan-
sive array of financial services, similar to those in the Annex to the
European Union's Second Banking Directive,'6 while on the other
hand, American FHCs will not enjoy the full benefits of universal
banking, such as information advantages and economies of scope.'-
Israel, and some European Union countries demonstrated stronger evidence of
scope economies in the joint production of commercial and investment banking
services in the universal banking model than seen in the American BHC model).
Santos concludes that when countries provide their banks more freedom to choose
their corporate structure in integrating securities and commercial banking activi-
ties, the banks usually decide to conduct these activities in-house - as in the Ger-
man and European Union universal banking model - or to conduct them in a sub-
sidiary of the bank - as in the United Kingdom. See id. at 19. Santos adds that the
holding company model only prevails in the United States because of the United
States' idiosyncratic regulatory structure, not because it is the most efficient model
for integrating securities activities. See id.
168. See LEWIS & PESCETTO, supra note 1, at 74 (explaining that until the pas-
sage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, BHCs were able to circumvent
the Glass Steagall Act's segregation of commercial and investment banking activi-
ties through a loophole - because they were not banks, they were not subject to
Glass Steagall's proscriptions).
169. Compare H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (listing the activities con-
sidered financial in nature and thus permissible for FHCs to engage in), with Sec-
ond Banking Directive, supra note 28, at 13 (listing permissible activities for
European credit institutions).
170. See SANTOS, supra note 158, at 18 (stating that corporate separateness lim-
its a financial conglomerate's ability to exploit economies of scope, and that in the
holding company model the relationship between the securities unit and the bank
are only indirect).
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IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BANKING REFORM
Proponents of domestic financial reform legislation are fervently
lobbying for action that will help eliminate the constraints of the
Glass Steagall Act."' This attitude, however, is too impulsive in an
industry that can be devastated by a flawed deregulatory policy, as so
aptly demonstrated the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s.'
While H.R. 10 does indeed take the much needed step of repealing
the restrictive provisions of the Glass Steagall Act, the proposed
legislation contains significant problems that must be addressed be-
fore it is enacted.
A. THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
In a deregulated financial system, there are a number of possible
corporate structures banks can adopt to integrate commercial banking
with securities activities. 3 The European Union permits its commer-
171. See Hearings on Fin. Servs. Modernization Before the House Banking and
Fin. Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (chaired by Rep. Jim Leach), reprinted in
FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 10, 1999 [hereinafter Hearings: Chaired by Jim Leach]
(reporting that Michael Patterson stated that the progress of H.R. 10 should not be
stifled by quarrels over issues of regulatory supervision). Patterson contends fur-
ther that Congress should not maintain obsolete laws because a consensus cannot
be reached regarding how to readjust the regulatory structure to the new market
reality. See id.
172. See generally LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991) (discussing the deregulatory
measures taken to modernize the savings and loan industry and commenting that
while such deregulatory measures implemented in the early 1980s were desper-
ately needed by the thrift industry, they were not accompanied by stronger safety
and soundness regulations). White ultimately finds that the combination of eco-
nomic deregulatory measures with the easing of safety-and-soundness rules created
disaster for the thrift industry, the federal insurance find, and the American tax-
payer. See id. The author discerns important lessons from the savings and loan de-
bacle and asserts that it is pertinent to recall those lessons in the future of bank,
thrift, and deposit insurance regulation in the United States and in other countries
seeking to prevent the repetition of the costly errors that the United States Gov-
ernment committed during the 1980s. See id. at 251-52.
173. See generally SANTOS, supra note 158 (comparing the three prevailing cor-
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cial banks to choose their corporate model, though there is an inher-
ent preference for the universal bank."" With its proposed financial
reform legislation, the United States resists the European Union's
liberal approach, opting instead to impose the familiar holding com-
pany structure upon American banks.' While the holding company
structure has supporters,'7 the justifications for selecting this corpo-
rate model are questionable and, arguably, reflect the agencies' self
interests, rather than an analysis of which corporate structure would
best suit the reformed financial marketplace.'" Moreover, the holding
company structure is now foreign to every other banking system in
porate structures for banks: (1) the universal bank; (2) the bank with a securities
subsidiary; and (3) the holding company with a banking subsidiary and a securities
subsidiary).
174. See Lewis & Pescetto, supra note 1, at 13 (contending that the Second
Banking Directive promotes competitive deregulation because of the advantages
that a country maintaining the most liberal banking system, such as the German
universal banking model, may achieve within the European Union).
175. See discussion supra Part III; see also H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103
(1999) (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to include the new
FHC entity).
176. See Edward D. Sullivan, Glass Steagall Update: Proposals to Modernize
the Structure of the Financial Services Industry, 112 BANKING L.J. 977, 993-994
(1995) (identifying the choice of corporate structure as a major issue in banking
reform and contending that the holding company structure is superior to the oper-
ating subsidiary model). Sullivan argues that, although both models maintain the
non-bank affiliate as a separate legal entity from the bank, the subsidiaries' posi-
tive or negative performance directly affects its parent bank's financial statements
and, therefore, places a greater strain on the deposit institution than the holding
company model. See id. Sullivan concludes that the separate affiliate concept of
the holding company structure is the most viable solution in the long term and ar-
gues that it enhances competition between the industries, while the firewalls permit
the commercial banks to remain safe and sound. See id. at 995; see also Shull &
White, supra note 34, at 448 (indicating that Alan Greenspan and the FRB favor
the holding company structure).
177. See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 12, at 28 (implying that regulatory
agencies may have their respective best interests in mind when choosing a corpo-
rate structure; for example, the FRB may seek to perpetuate its current ability to
supervise the financial system through the continuance of the holding company
structure); see also SANTOS, supra note 158, at 17 (stating that the corporate
structure debate is so prominent because of the impact it will have on determining
the regulatory agency that will oversee the securities activities).
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the world, except the United States, thereby strongly implying that an
alternative solution is preferable. 
78
Ultimately, the holding company approach taken in the proposed
financial reform legislation may place the United States at a disad-
vantage, by forcing domestic banks to compete against foreign banks
that benefit from the economies of scope and cost advantages that re-
sult from the freedom to choose their corporate structure.'" Conse-
quently, the key goal of improving the competitive posture of
American banks through domestic financial reform may remain out
of reach if the current proposal is enacted.80
B. SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In addition to corporate structure problems, the proposed financial
reform legislation is fraught with regulatory challenges that may
threaten the safety and soundness of the banking system if not ad-
dressed before its adoption.' A significant hurdle facing financial
178. See SANTOS, supra note 158, at 19 (emphasizing that the holding company
structure is implemented only in the United States).
179. See id. at 7, 16 (stating that economies of scope are essential to the effi-
ciency and success of financial conglomerates, and to universal banks in particular,
and concluding that holding companies do not enjoy comparable economies of
scope).
180. See id. at 16, 19 (explaining that in the bank-subsidiary and the holding
company models, commercial banking and securities activities are carried out in
legally separate entities, with different management teams and distinct capital, and
that, afforded the choice, banks usually choose the operating-subsidiary or the uni-
versal bank over the holding company for corporate structure). Santos concludes
that in order for banks to remain competitive in today's marketplace, they must be
permitted to choose their corporate structure. See id. at 20-21; see also Hearings:
Statement of Eugene Ludwig, supra note 8, at 15 (highlighting the fact that greater
freedom in corporate structure has not impaired bank safety and soundness abroad
and, according to foreign bank supervisors, it provides essential support from non-
traditional banking activities when the traditional banking activities encounter fi-
nancial stress).
181. See generally Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Banking and Fin.
Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (prepared testimony of Ralph Nader), reprinted
in FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 11, 1999 [hereinafter Hearings: Testimony of Ralph
Nader] (pinpointing safety and soundness weaknesses in the proposed legislation
and the dangers of the FRB as the lead regulator in the proposed legislation).
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reform is that H.R. 10, as proposed, arguably alters risks to the de-
posit insurance system and the federal safety net without reorganiz-
ing and rationalizing the supervisory structure.' Instead of revamp-
ing the currently fragmented and overlapping financial regulatory
system, the proposed legislation exacerbates the problem by dele-
gating regulation not only among six federal agencies, but also
among the agencies of fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico.'83
While the proponents of this functional regulation argue that the
supervisory responsibilities are streamlined under the FRB as the
umbrella regulator,"' the reality is that inefficiencies, conflicting in-
terpretations of regulations, and a lack of accountability still plague
the proposed regulatory system."' Even more alarming is that the
agencies seem to be thwarting regulatory innovation to prevent a
182. See id. (mentioning the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s and the im-
plicit promise Congress made to the American people that additional risks would
not be imposed upon deposit insurance and the federal safety net without stronger
regulation).
183. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. I11 (1999) (dividing the supervision of
FHCs among the FRB, functional regulators, and state supervisory authorities); see
also Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (arguing that the legis-
lation makes the system worse by scattering responsibilities under the guise of
maintaining functional regulation as if it was a "regulatory holy writ").
184. See Tara L. Meltzer, Congress, Regulators Split Over Major Banking Re-
forn Bills, 16 BANKING POL'Y REP. 6, 8 (1997) (restating Alan Greenspan's argu-
ment that consolidated umbrella supervision by the FRB is not only feasible, but
necessary to protect the nation's financial system and safety net, which is supplied
by federal deposit insurance and access to monies through the FRB's discount
window).
185. See Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (explaining that
as it was enacted in 1913, the Federal Reserve Act permits commercial banks to
choose two thirds of the board of directors of each of the twelve Federal Reserve
Banks, and that the boards are filled with bankers and representatives of securities
and insurance companies). The role of the Federal Reserve Bank boards is to ex-
amine and supervise holding companies and, arguably, the current system of board
delegation contains inherent conflicts of interest. See id. Additionally, in 1994,
Eugene Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency, candidly admitted that it is
never completely clear which agency is accountable for problems resulting from
faulty, overly burdensome, or late regulations. See id.
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change that might endanger their share of the regulatory turf,86 while
agency insiders themselves question whether the current patchwork
regulatory structure can function effectively in today's complex
banking environment."'
C. TRANSPARENCY, CONSUMER RIGHTS, AND PROTECTION
Finally, in addition to structural issues regarding a corporate
model and supervisory responsibilities, consumer interest in this po-
tentially monumental banking reform is of concern. Although the
proposed financial reform legislation contains important disclosure
requirements regarding fees and costs of financial products to help
foster transparency, as well as privacy provisions,' some fear that
the proposed legislation does not fully address consumers' needs in
the financial services industry.'89 In fact, some consumer advocates
argue that the proposed legislation represents no more than a victory
of the industries' needs over those of consumers. 9 0
Originally, H.R. 10, as introduced and passed by the House
Banking and Financial Services Committee and the House Com-
merce Committee,'9' lacked provisions regarding two key consumer
186. See id. (concluding that strong agency opposition to regulatory reform has
been successful in preventing needed change).
187. See id. (indicating that the former head of the General Accounting Office,
Charles Bowsher, frequently asked Congress to change and coordinate the regula-
tory system, expressing his doubts regarding the efficacy of the system in 1993).
Nader asserts that H.R. 10 proposes to pile even more responsibility upon this
same regulatory system. See id.
188. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 241 (1999) (mandating that each Federal fi-
nancial regulatory authority create or revise its rules to foster consistency in the
disclosure of fees and costs imposed upon customers).
189. See generally Hearings on Financial Modernization and H.R. 10 Before the
House Banking and Fin. Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director), reprinted in FED. NEWS SERV., Feb.
11, 1999, [hereinafter Hearings: Testimony of Edmund Mierzwinski (highlighting
ways in which H.R. 10 could be modified to better address consumer needs).
190. See id. (summarizing Mierzwinski's view that H.R. 10 represents a triumph
of special interests over communities, taxpayers, and consumers).
191. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (as passed by the House Banking and Fi-
nancial Services Committee February 27, 1999); H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (as
passed by the House Commerce Committee on June 15, 1999).
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concerns: (1) the need to restore low-cost basic banking services;' 92
and (2) the need to ensure that consumer privacy is adequately pro-
tected in the marketplace. This latter issue is of particular concern to
consumer advocates as captive consumers may find themselves
trapped in unsolicited cross-marketing schemes within the newly
proposed financial conglomerates.'9"
Eventually, Congress struck a compromise and revised the pro-
posed financial reform legislation to include provisions addressing
privacy issues.' 9 Presently, as to consumer privacy rights, H.R. 10
includes a requirement that financial institutions implement specific
privacy policies and inform their customers as to how the financial
institutions intend to use customers' information.'" Additionally,
H.R. 10 requires financial institutions to permit customers to "opt
out" of having their information sold or otherwise distributed to third
parties. However, H.R. 10 permits the sharing of customer informa-
tion among affiliated companies without providing an "opt out," as
long as the customers have been informed of the privacy policy.',
Curiously enough, the European Union's Second Banking Direc-
192. See Hearings: Testimony of Edmund Miermvinski supra note 189 (ex-
pressing shock at the fact that virtually every request by special industry interests
were retained in the proposed legislation, whereas the sole amendment to protect
consumers from increasing banking fees was deleted from H.R. 10).
193. See Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (stating that pro-
ponents of H.R. 10 have tried to sell the bill by promoting the one-stop shopping
argument that the new financial conglomerates will be places where consumers can
dabble in the stock market, purchase insurance products, and access a number of
banking products). Nader contends that consumers are not asking for these one-
stop financial shopping centers, but rather are expressing concerns about the di-
minishing quality of service and the growth of arbitrary services at sky-rocketing
costs. See id. Moreover, the propaganda behind H.R. 10 covers up the risk that
consumers will be entrapped in undesired and anti-competitive cross-marketing
promotions, with little protection of personal privacy. See id.
194. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999) (as passed by the full House of Represen-
tatives on July 1, 1999) (including Title V, which sets forth measures to protect
nonpublic personal information of customers of financial conglomerates).
195. See id.
196. See id. at tit. IV. By contrast, the Senate version of financial reform legisla-
tion, which was passed by the Senate Banking Committee on May 6, 1999, con-
tains no limits on the sharing of customer information. See S.900, 106th Cong.
(1999).
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tive mentions consumers generally in its preamble, '97 however, it
does not contain provisions extensively addressing consumer issues.
This omission is most likely due to the fact that some consumer
needs are simply incompatible with the underlying rationale for
banking reform, notably the banking industry's desire to achieve
greater efficiencies among financial affiliates.198 In effect, the Euro-
pean Union has chosen to address consumer privacy issues in sepa-
rate legislation rather than in its Second Banking Directive.
As for domestic financial reform legislation, while provisions have
been added to H.R. 10 addressing various privacy issues, some con-
gressional officials have expressed their desire to deal with those is-
sues in separate legislation. In sum, although Congress seems to
strike a compromise in H.R. 10 between protecting consumers and
permitting financial conglomerates to engage in cross-marketing
within the same corporate entity, consumer privacy will remain an
important topic of discussion before financial reform legislation is
enacted and may ultimately prove to be a major obstacle for Con-
gress in its push for change in the banking industry.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although inherent problems exist in the current movement for
domestic financial reform,'99 Congress should not allow these prob-
lems to break the momentum for change. In providing recommenda-
tions to Congress on financial reform, it is imperative to recall the
gamut of parties implicated by this deregulatory movement, which
197. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 28, at pmbl. (citing the protec-
tion of consumers and investors as a purpose of the directive).
198. See NAI Expressed Support for H.R. 10; Recommends Minor Changes,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 10, 1999 (expressing the insurance industry's support of the
proposed H.R. 10 and stating that the insurance industry is not troubled by the idea
of increased competition as banks enter the insurance business). The insurance in-
dustry views banks as prospective business partners that will generate new cross-
marketing opportunities. See id. The insurance industry also believes that this
cross-marketing ability will lead to more competition in insurance markets and,
ultimately, the customers will be able to access a wider array of services at the
lowest prices possible. See id.
199. See discussion supra Part IV (identifying three problems currently con-
fronting American banking reform).
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runs from the insurance, securities, and banking industries, to the
regulatory agencies, to the actual consumers." This wide range of
parties adds to the difficulty of reaching an agreement for change
that satisfies all groups affected in the financial services industry.'
Nonetheless, reform must be achieved and several recommendations
are set forth below regarding how Congress might address the cur-
rent problems existing in the proposed financial reform legislation or
future legislation.
A. ADDING FLEXIBILITY IN THE CHOICE OF
CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The provisions of the proposed legislation require American
commercial banks seeking to affiliate with securities firms to adopt a
holding company organizational structure.0 2 While Congress has ac-
cepted the FHC model in H.R. 10, this corporate structure prevails
only in the United States.23 In European countries, where banks en-
joy more leeway to choose their own corporate structure for operat-
ing their securities and banking activities, securities activities are
usually conducted in-house' 0 or in a subsidiary of the bank. :" Al-
though the current trend in American banking reform has been to
200. See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 12, at 25-26 (identifying and discussing
the numerous parties involved in the on-going debate on financial modernization).
201. See id. (explaining that although the key players directly affected by the
debate on how to achieve financial modernization all agree that the current system
must be revamped, their divergent and often conflicting interests have contributed
to Congress' great difficulty over the past several years in attempting to craft re-
form legislation that accommodates all interested parties).
202. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (permitting securities firms and
commercial banks to affiliate within a FHC corporate structure).
203. See SANTOS, supra note 158, at 19 (indicating that the holding company
structure is implemented uniquely by the United States' financial services industry,
and concluding that this structure is the least preferable corporate structure for a
bank seeking to integrate securities activities in the most efficient and competitive
manner possible).
204. See id. (noting that Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland all
conduct their banking and securities activities within the same corporate entity).
205. See id. (commenting that banks in the United Kingdom conduct their secu-
rities activities in a subsidiary of the bank).
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conclude that the moral hazard introduced by the safety net of FDIC
insurance justifies a regulation mandating banks to adopt a specific
organizational form,2°6 historical evidence and international postures
indicate the contrary. 7
In light of the potential gains that result from combining commer-
cial banking with securities activities,08 Congress should not only
permit commercial banks to engage in securities activities but also
should provide them with the freedom to select their corporate
structure. To achieve this end, Congress needs to revise the proposed
legislation by eliminating the provision that imposes the formation of
a FHC,2°9 and instead accord American banks the latitude to choose
their corporate structure, like their international competitors can.
Such a provision would permit American banks to choose a corpo-
rate model based upon their capitalization needs, giving them the
possibility to explore the advantages of different corporate structures
and, ultimately, compete more effectively with their international
••• 210
competitors.
206. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (adopting a holding company
structure, arguably, based upon the rationale that such structure best protects the
FDIC's federal safety net); see also SANTOS, supra note 158, at 20-21 (arguing that
the United States erred in assuming that the moral hazard introduced by the federal
safety net warranted the Glass Steagall Act, a regulation that prohibited banks from
engaging in the securities business, and, additionally, that such moral hazard does
not justify the current American trend to impose a particular organizational struc-
ture on commercial banks and securities firms seeking to affiliate).
207. See SANTOS, supra note 158, at 21 (concluding an international review of
commercial banks in the securities business by stating that both historical and in-
ternational evidence demonstrate that there is no reason to preclude commercial
banks from conducting securities activities, or to force commercial banks to con-
form to a particular corporate structure when affiliating with a securities firm).
208. See LEWIS & PESCETI"O, supra note 1, at 192 (noting economies of scope
and enhanced economic development as benefits that result from the liberal uni-
versal banking implemented by the European Union's Second Banking Directive);
see also SANTOS, supra note 158, at 20 (identifying economies of scope in the pro-
duction and consumption of financial services as potential gains from the combi-
nation of traditional commercial banking and securities activities).
209. See H.R. 10, 106th Cong. sec. 103 (1999) (implementing a FHC structure
in American financial reform by amending the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 to also cover FHCs).
210. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing the FHC corporate structure
1756 [14:1715
BANKING REFORM
B. REFORMING THE SUPERVISORY STRUCTURE
In addition to imposing a corporate structure, the current financial
reform legislation deregulates the banking landscape in the United
States without adequately coordinating and enhancing the supervi-
sory structure to ensure the future safety and soundness of the new
system.2" When the European Union undertook the challenge of re-
forming its banking laws, it placed great emphasis on coordinating
its supervisory structure. Ultimately, the European Union opted for
a conservative safety net under its Second Banking Directive, by re-
quiring minimum standards and home country supervision.2 ,
While the European Union's supervisory structure is not necessar-
ily the ideal model to follow, if Congress is intent on modernizing
the nation's financial system it must also revise and coordinate its
supervisory structure."4 Designating the FRB as the umbrella regu-
lator arguably is not the solution, because it appears to be no more
than an extension of a flawed and outdated structure.2" Instead, Con-
that H.R. 10 imposes upon American banks and contrasting it with the European
Union's Second Banking Directive, which does not mandate a particular corporate
structure for commercial banks); see also Hearings: Statement of Eugene Ludwig
supra note 8, at 15 n.5 (contending that the imposition of a holding company
structure upon American banks is especially problematic given the organizational
flexibility that other countries' banks enjoy and the fact that the financial services
marketplace is increasingly globalized).
211. See Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (citing several
inherent problems in the supervisory structure that H.R. 10 perpetuates in its finan-
cial reform under the guise of functional regulation).
212. See LEWIS & PESCETrO, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining that the imple-
mentation of the single banking license principle, which is enshrined in the Second
Banking Directive, leads to the mutual recognition of Member State regulatory
bodies for the list of activities set forth in the directive); see also Second Banking
Directive, supra note 28, at pmbl. (identifying the coordination and harmonization
of the European Union's supervisory laws as a key purpose of the directive).
213. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 28, at tit. II (discussing the har-
monization of authorization conditions in the directive).
214. See Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (imploring Con-
gress to modernize the financial industry's supervisory structure in tandem with
the financial industry's restructuring and deregulation).
215. See id. (recognizing the irony that the strongest proponents of financial re-
form are fixated on the urgent need to eliminate the antiquated Glass Steagall Act
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gress should explore the merits of alternative regulatory regimes."6
Ideally, the creation of a single, coordinated agency, having exclu-
sive responsibility over the regulation of financial service providers,
would rectify the currently fragmented regulatory structure and foster
greater accountability in the supervisory regime' 17 Although the task
of examining viable alternatives to the present regulatory structure is
a formidable one for Congress to undertake, and one that may pro-
long banking reform, any delay in enacting new banking legislation
is infinitely preferable to dealing with the fallout of a poorly crafted
and failed regulatory regime."8
C. ADDRESSING CONSUMER NEEDS
Although consumer advocates have argued that the proposed fi-
nancial reform legislation fails to adequately address consumer
of 1933, but at the same time are comfortable with the supervisory structure of the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which is riddled with conflicts of interest, a lack of
accountability, and great secrecy). Nader questions who would champion the Fed-
eral Reserve Act of 1913 as an appropriate framework for a federal regulatory
agency. See id.
216. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 28, at pmbl. (indicating the key
purpose of coordinating and harmonizing the European Union's supervisory laws
and specifically addressing coordination issues in Title II of the Directive).
217. See Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (noting that over
the years, bills have been proposed to form a single coordinated agency that would
have complete responsibility over the regulation of the financial services industry).
Nader contends that such legislation ultimately failed due to opposition from di-
vergent parts of the financial services community, each lobbying to retain its cur-
rent and predictable agency responsibilities. See id. The agencies have also sty-
mied any legislation that would place their share of the regulatory territory at risk.
See id. Nader concludes that Congress should not attempt to modernize the finan-
cial structure without also modernizing the regulatory structure. See id.
218. See WHITE, supra note 172, at 193 (stating that the costs of cleaning up the
problems of the failed regulatory structure of thrifts in the savings and loan debacle
will be enormous and that there is no way of assessing precisely how great the cost
will be). White contends that it is only fair that the burden of meeting those costs
be borne by the Treasury and the American public because it was their govern-
ment's poor design and administration that instigated the debacle. See id. at 199.
Moreover, there is no other logical place to rest the burden but upon the govern-
ment and its constituents. See id. at 199-200.
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needs,2 9 there is no need to include additional consumer protection or
privacy provisions in H.R. 10. In addressing the consumer privacy
issue, it is imperative to recall that financial services companies are
not alone in using consumer data. In fact, the use of consumer data is
an essential practice of successful companies throughout the Ameri-
can economy, which strive to improve products and services for their
customers.220 Accordingly, H.R. 10 sufficiently addresses consumer
privacy issues by permitting them to "opt out" of having their infor-
mation sold or otherwise distributed to third parties. A provision pro-
scribing financial conglomerates from sharing consumer information
among affiliates would needlessly restrict domestic financial institu-
tions and place them at a competitive disadvantage internationally.
Moreover, such a restrictive provision would most likely thwart the
enactment of financial reform legislation altogether.
While consumer needs indisputably constitute an important con-
cern in the financial services industry, Congress cannot adequately
address such an issue as a tangent to financial services restructur-
ing.22' Rather than amending H.R. 10 to include provisions proscrib-
ing financial conglomerates from sharing information among affili-
ates, Congress should negotiate with consumer advocates regarding
their concerns. The ideal solution would be to eliminate all consumer
privacy provisions from the proposed financial reform legislation and
to find a different and more appropriate forum to address consumer
issues, such as through alternative legislation.-'
219. See Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader, supra note 181 (stating that H.R.
10 tilts overwhelmingly in favor of financial corporations and proposes that Con-
gress amend the legislation to include a provision permitting the enclosure of no-
tices from consumer associations in billings and other mailings of financial institu-
tions, so that the consumers' voices can be heard).
220. See Hearings: Chaired by Jim Leach, supra note 171 (arguing that the use
of consumer information is imperative in developing new products and services for
consumers in all types of businesses in the United States).
221. See id. (emphasizing that the privacy issue is at an embryonic phase and
that Congress should not strive to resolve this issue as a sidebar to financial re-
form).
222. See id. (providing the testimony of John McCoy, President and CEO of
Bank One Corporation, in which he states that the banking industry is already
subject to expansive privacy regulations, unlike any other industry, and that Con-
gress has mandated its compliance with numerous privacy laws over the past thirty
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CONCLUSION
The need to reform domestic banking laws is no longer the ques-
tion - the Glass Steagall Act must, and most likely will, be disman-
tled in the near future. The real issue, however, is how to achieve this
vital reform. With its currently proposed financial reform legislation,
the United States has shied away from the more revolutionary
changes embodied in the European Union's Second Banking Direc-
tive. Instead, the United States clings to remnants of this country's
idiosyncratic regulatory past.
If this year's financial reform legislation is not enacted, Congress
will undoubtedly reintroduce similar reform legislation in the up-
coming year because the need for reform will not subside. Either
way, before Congress makes a definitive decision regarding legisla-
tion to revamp the nation's financial services industry, whether in the
immediate or distant future, it should carefully analyze why the
European Union's Second Banking Directive has been so successful.
In addition, Congress should reconsider imposing the FHC corporate
model on the American financial services industry and the retention
of the currently fragmented supervisory structure. Such reflection is
required if Congress is to implement the solution American banks
truly need to launch them into the twenty-first century.
years).
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